Bay Algorithmic Game Theory Symposium
Meeting 1: Feb. 17, 2006, 10am-5pm, Building 1, MSR-SVC, 1065 La Avenida, Mountain View, CA. |
10:00-10:30 | Arrivals, Registration, Coffee, and Breakfast | ||
10:30-11:00 | Talk: | Hal Varian | "Position Auctions" |
Talk: | Ramesh Johari | "Comm. Reqs. of VCG-like Mechs. in Convex Envs." | |
11:30-12:00 | Open Problems Session | ||
12:00-1:30 | Lunch (provided) | ||
1:30-2:00 | Talk: | Eric Friedman | "On the Manipulation of Ranking and Reputation Systems" |
2:00-2:30 | Talk: | Kunal Talwar | "Monopolistic pricing, profit extraction, and popping balloons" |
2:30-3:00 | Open Problems Session | ||
3:00-4:00 | Coffee Break | ||
4:00-4:30 | Talk: | Ilya Segal | "Communication Costs of Selfishness" |
4:30-5:00 | Talk: | "Combinatorial Agency" | |
Dinner at local restaurants (not provided). |
(Joint work with Ronald Fadel)
The Shapley value mechanism can extract the function f(v)=max_i iv_i (assuming the v_i's are sorted in descending order). What other functions can be extracted truthfully? We relate this question to a natural balloon-popping problem. We then show that for a suitably general class of profit extraction mechanisms, the maximum revenue extractable is at most a constant times that of the Shapley value mechanism.
(joint work with Nicole Immorlica, Anna Karlin and Mohammad Mahdian.)
Moshe Babaioff | UC Berkeley |
Jason Hartline | Microsoft Research |
Robert Kleinberg | UC Berkeley |
Tim Roughgarden | Stanford U. |