I am currently a postdoc researcher at the Microsoft Research, NYC Lab. I received my PhD from the Computer Science Department of Cornell University, where I had the privilege to be advised by Eva Tardos.

Efficiency of Mechanisms in Complex Markets
PhD Thesis, August 2014

My research interests lie at the intersection of the areas of Algorithms, Game Theory, Auction Theory, Mechanism Design, Econometrics, Data Science, Online Learning Theory and Computational Complexity of Games. More specifically, I am interested in the game theoretic foundations of electronic markets, with an emphasis on the design and analysis of simple auctions.

I was awarded a Simons Graduate Fellowship in Theoretical Computer Science 2012-2014. I was also a finalist for the Facebook Fellowship 2012. I spent the last two summers as a research intern at MSR New England where I had the pleasure and honor to work with Jennifer Chayes, Christian Borgs, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica and Brendan Lucier. (appeared in MSR Research Highlights). I spent the summer of 2011 at MSR Cambridge, UK where I had the pleasure to work with Yoram Bachrach and Milan Vojnovic. In the spring of 2011 I visited the Center for the Study of Rationality at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem as part of the semester in Algorithmic Game Theory.

Working Papers

Fast Convergence of Regularized Learning in Games
Vasilis Syrgkanis, Alekh Agarwal, Haipeng Luo, Robert E. Schapire

No-Regret Learning in Repeated Bayesian Games
Jason Hartline, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos

Robust Data-Driven Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions
Darrell Hoy, Denis Nekipelov, Vasilis Syrgkanis
Preliminary version at 1st Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory and Data Science (in conj. with EC’15)

Learning and Efficiency in Games with Dynamic Population
Thodoris Lykouris, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos

The Price of Anarchy in Large Games
Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis

Price of Stability in Games of Incomplete Information
Vasilis Syrgkanis


21. Econometrics for Learning Agents
Denis Nekipelov, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos, EC 2015
Best paper award

20. Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Bandit Exploration
Yishay Mansour, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Vasilis Syrgkanis, EC 2015

19. Greedy Algorithms make Efficient Mechanisms
Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis, EC 2015

18. Simple Auctions with Simple Strategies
Nikhil Devanur, Jamie Morgenstern, Vasilis Syrgkanis, S. Matthew Weinberg, EC 2015
(preliminary version appeared as Draft Auctions)

17. Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals
Vasilis Syrgkanis, David Kempe, Eva Tardos, EC 2015

16. Social Status and Badge Design
Nicole Immorlica, Greg Stoddard, Vasilis Syrgkanis, WWW 2015
(Preliminary version at 2013 NBER Market Design Working Group Meeting and NIPS'13 Workshop on Crowdsourcing)

15. A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes
Michal Feldman, Uriel Feige, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis, AAAI 2015

14. Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games and Coalitional Dynamics
Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos, Milan Vojnovic, SAGT 2014

13. Composable and Efficient Mechanisms
Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos, STOC 2013

12. Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis, EC 2013

11. Vickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions
Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis, WINE 2013

10. Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments
Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Milan Vojnovic, WINE 2013

9. Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions
Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis, WINE 2013

8. Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects
Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos, WINE 2013

7. Bayesian Games and the Smoothness Framework
Vasilis Syrgkanis, March 2012

6. Bayesian Sequential Auctions
Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos, EC 2012

5. Sequential Auctions and Externalities
Renato Paes Leme, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos, SODA 2012

4. The Curse of Simultaneity
Renato Paes Leme, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos, ITCS 2012

3. Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal Auctions
Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Omer Tamuz, WINE 2012

2. The Complexity of Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games
Vasilis Syrgkanis, WINE 2010 [Slides]

1. Colored Resource Allocation Games
E. Bampas, A. Pagourtzis, G. Pierrakos, V. Syrgkanis, CTW 2009


The Dining Bidder Problem: a la russe et a la francaise
Renato Paes Leme, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos, SIGecom Exchanges, December 2012
A review of recent results in simultaneous and sequential item auctions.


Efficiency of Mechanisms in Complex Markets
PhD Thesis, Cornell University, Computer Science Department, August 2014

Equilibria in Congestion Game Models: Existence, Complexity and Efficiency
Vasilis Syrgkanis
Undergraduate Diploma Thesis, National Technical University of Athens, July 2009 (title is in Greek but main content, p. 6 and on, is in English)

Professional Service

Program Committee: EC 2013, AdAuctions 2014, EC 2015, IJCAI 2015, WINE 2015, AdAuctions 2015
Journal Reviewer: Journal of the ACM, SIAM Journal on Computing, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Journal of Machine Learning Research, IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control


Vasilis Syrgkanis
641 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY, 10011
Email: vasy [at] microsoft.com


Brief Resume: PDF