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Brendan Lucier

Brendan Lucier


Microsoft Research, New England

email: brlucier [at] microsoft [dot] com

Please Note: As of December 2016, this page is no longer being updated. Please see my official Microsoft landing page here.


Spring 2016: cs234r - Markets for Networks and Crowds

Research Interests

Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Social Networks, Game Theory, Approximation Algorithms, Stochastic Processes.


Pretium: Dynamic Pricing and Traffic Engineering for Timely Inter-Datacenter Transfers
V. Jalaparti, I. Bliznets, S. Kandula, B. Lucier, I. Menache. SIGCOMM 2016.

Procrastination with Variable Present Bias
N. Gravin, N. Immorlica, B. Lucier, E. Pountourakis: EC 2016.

The price of anarchy in large games
M. Feldman, N. Immorlica, B. Lucier, T. Roughgarden, V. Syrgkanis: STOC 2016.

From Duels to Battefields: Computing Equilibria of Blotto and Other Games
M. Ahmadinejad, S. Dehghani, M. Hajiaghayi, B. Lucier, H. Mahini, S. Seddighin: AAAI 2016.

Influence at Scale: Distributed Computation of Complex Contagion in Networks
B. Lucier, J. Oren, and Y. Singer. KDD 2015.

Truthful Online Scheduling with Commitments
Y. Azar, I. Kalp-Shaltiel, B. Lucier, I. Menache, J. Naor and J. Yaniv. EC 2015.

Randomization beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction
H. Fu, N. Immorlica, B. Lucier and P. Strack. EC 2015.

Greedy Algorithms make Efficient Mechanisms
B. Lucier and V. Syrgkanis. EC 2015.

A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes
U. Feige, M. Feldman, N. Immorlica, R. Izsak, B. Lucier, and V. Syrgkanis. AAAI 2015.

Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
M. Feldman, N. Gravin, and B. Lucier. SODA 2015.

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
M. Babaioff, N. Immorlica, B. Lucier, and S. M. Weinberg. FOCS 2014.

Clearing Markets via Bundles
M. Feldman and B. Lucier. SAGT 2014.

Reaching Consensus via non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks.
M. Feldman, N. Immorlica, B. Lucier, and S. M. Weinberg. APPROX 2014.

Online (Budgeted) Social Choice
B. Lucier and J. Oren. AAAI 2014.

On the Efficiency of the Walrasian Mechanism
M. Babaioff, B. Lucier, N. Nisan, and R. Paes Leme. EC 2014.

User Satisfaction in Competitive Sponsored Search
D. Kempe and B. Lucier. WWW 2014.

Maximizing Social Influence in Nearly Optimal Time
C. Borgs, M. Brautbar, J. Chayes, and B. Lucier. SODA 2014.

Influence Maximization in Undirected Networks
S. Khanna and B. Lucier. SODA 2014.

Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions
M. Feldman, B. Lucier and V. Syrgkanis. WINE 2013.

Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects
B. Lucier, Y. Singer, V. Syrgkanis, and E. Tardos. WINE 2013.

Efficient Online Scheduling for Deadline-Sensitive Batch Computing
B. Lucier, I. Menache, J. Naor, and J. Yaniv. SPAA 2013.

Bertrand Networks
M. Babaioff, B. Lucier, and N. Nisan. EC 2013.

Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design
H. Fu, B. Lucier, B. Sivan, and V. Skyrgkanis. EC 2013.

Pricing Public Goods for Private Sale
M. Feldman, D. Kempe, B. Lucier, and R. Paes Leme. EC 2013.

Equilibria of Online Scheduling Algorithms.
I. Ashlagi, B. Lucier, and M. Tennenholtz. AAAI 2013.

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Competitive Influence in Networks
A. Borodin, M. Braverman, B. Lucier, and J. Oren. WWW 2013.

Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium
M. Feldman, N. Gravin, and B. Lucier. STOC 2013.

Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient
M. Feldman, H. Fu, N. Gravin, and B. Lucier. STOC 2013.

The Power of Local Information in Social Networks
C. Borgs, M. Brautbar, J. Chayes, S. Khanna, and B. Lucier. WINE 2012.

On the Impossibility of Black-Box Transformations in Mechanism Design
S. Chawla, N. Immorlica, and B. Lucier. STOC 2012.

On Revenue in the Generalized Second Price Auction
B. Lucier, R. Paes Leme, and E. Tardos. WWW 2012.

GSP Auctions with Correlated Types
B. Lucier and R. Paes Leme. EC 2011.

Dueling Algorithms
N. Immorlica, A. Kalai, B. Lucier, A. Moitra, A. Postlewaite, and M. Tennenholtz. STOC 2011.

The Hitchhiker's Guide to Affiliation Networks: A Game-Theoretic Approach
C. Borgs, J. Chayes, J. Ding, and B. Lucier. ITCS 2011.

The Glauber dynamics for colourings of bounded degree trees
B. Lucier, M. Molloy. SIAM J. Disc. Math 25, 827-853 (2011).

Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design
J. Hartline and B. Lucier. STOC 2010.

Cooperation in Anonymous Dynamic Social Networks
N. Immorlica, B. Lucier, and B. Rogers. EC 2010.
Also appeared in the Workshop on Information in Networks (WIN) 2010.

Beyond Equilibria: Mechanisms for Repeated Combinatorial Auctions
B. Lucier. ITCS 2010.

Price of Anarchy for Greedy Auctions
B. Lucier and A. Borodin. SODA 2010.

Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions
A. Borodin and B. Lucier. ICALP 2010.

The Glauber dynamics for colourings of bounded degree trees
B. Lucier, M. Molloy, and Y. Peres. RANDOM 2009.

Local Overlaps in Special Unfoldings of Convex Polyhedra
B. Lucier. Canadian Conference on Combinatorial Geometry (CCCG) 2006.
Computational Geometry: Theory and Applications 42(5): 495-504 (2009).

Local Overlaps in Unfoldings of Polyhedra
B. Lucier and A. Lubiw. Fall Workshop on Combinatorial Geometry (FWCG) 2006.

Average Case Analysis of QuickSort and Insertion Tree Height using Incompressibility
T. Jiang, M. Li, and B. Lucier. Inf. Process. Lett. 103(2): 45-51 (2007).