We study problems in the intersection of Computer Science, Game Theory and Microeconomics. We are particularly focused on effects of strategic behavior in electronic markets, as such behavior has significant implications on the economic performance of these markets.
Overview
We study several problems related to game theory. These problems are motivated by e-commerce applications and applications of game theory to computer system and network design. In mechanism design, we aim to develop mechanisms with useful properties which optimize an objective function, such as seller's revenue or global welfare of the system, in the worst- or average-case. Our work shows that techniques from learning, on-line algorithms, and coding theory can be applied to mechanism design. We also study complexity of computational problems that come up in implementations of game-theoretic mechanisms. Finally, we are interested in research problems on the borderline of Economics and Computer Science, including Game Theory, Social Networks, and Electronic Markets.
Past Members
- Liad Blumrosen
- Jason Hartline
Project Visitors
- Avrim Blum
- Amos Fiat
- Anna Karlin
- Robert Kleinberg
- Tim Roughgarden
- Eyal Winter
- Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, and Aleksandrs Slivkins, Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation, in ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'10), Association for Computing Machinery, Inc., June 2010
- Moshe Babaioff, Yogeshwer Sharma, and Aleksandrs Slivkins, Characterizing Truthful Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms, in ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'09), Association for Computing Machinery, Inc., July 2009
- Nicole Immorlica, Anna R. Karlin, Mohammad Mahdian, and Kunal Talwar, Balloon Popping With Applications to Ascending Auctions, in Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), IEEE Communications Society, Providence, RI, October 2007
- Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline, and Robert Kleinberg, Algorithmic Pricing via Virtual Valuations, in ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC 2007), San Diego, CA, June 2007
- Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin, Michael Saks, and Andrew Wright, Competitive Auctions, in Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 55, no. 2, pp. 242–269, Elsevier, May 2006
- Gagan Aggarwal and Jason D. Hartline, Knapsack Auctions, in ACM/SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), Miami, FL, January 2006
- G. Aggarwal, A. Fiat, A. Goldberg, J. Hartline, N. Imorlica, and M. Sudan, Derandomization of Auctions, in Proc. 37rd ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, ACM Press, January 2005
- A. V. Goldberg and J. D. Hartline, Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents, in Proc. 16th Symp. on Discr. Alg., 2005
- Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin, and Michael E. Saks, A Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio of Truthful Auctions, in 21st Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science (STACS 2004), Springer, March 2004
- Andrew V. Goldberg and Jason D. Hartline, Envy-Free Auctions for Digital Goods, in ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC '03), Association for Computing Machinery, Inc., San Diego, CA, June 2003
- K. Deshmukh, A. V. Goldberg, J. D. Hartline, and A. R. Karlin, Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions, in Proceedings of the 10th European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA '02), Springer-Verlag, September 2002
- A. Fiat, A. V. Goldberg, J. D. Hartline, and A. Karlin, Competitive Generalized Auctions, in Proc. 34th Symp. on Theory of Comp., 2002
