Anonymous credential systems allow users to authenticate themselves in a privacy-preserving manner. In a credential system, a user Alice can obtain credentials from an organization, and then at some later point, she can prove to the organization (or any other party) that she has been given appropriate credentials. In an anonymous credential system, she can do this without revealing anything else about her identity. In fact, we can even guarantee that if she uses her credential a second time, no one will be able to tell that the two interactions involved the same user. Not only is it impossible to identify Alice; there will be no way anyone can trace Alice's transactions.
Our research has focused primarily on using new developments in proof systems (such as the pairing based constructions of Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai) to design credential schemes which rely on weaker assumptions, allow users to perform a wider range of transactions anonymously, or prevent users from abusing their privileges.
- Sherman Chow (New York University)
- Melissa Chase and Sherman S.M. Chow, Improving Privacy and Security in Multi-Authority Attribute-Based Encryption, in ACM Computer and Communications Security Conference (CCS '09), Association for Computing Machinery, Inc., November 2009.
- Mira Belenkiy, Melissa Chase, Markulf Kohlweiss, and Anna Lysyanskaya, Compact E-Cash and Simulatable VRFs Revisited, in Pairing 2009, Springer Verlag, August 2009.