I am a post-doc in the Economics group at Microsoft Research New England. My work is mainly in mechanism design, especially in non-equilibrium-based approaches to mechanism design. I am secretly way more awesome than this boring-looking website lets on. One day my website will reflect that and then the world will be MINE!!! But yeah, right now I haven't gotten around to making a better site, so uh, just pretend you didn't see this.
For non-Microsoft-related business: firstname.lastname@example.org / +1 (617) 953-8419
For Microsoft-related business: email@example.com / +1 (857) 453-6181
Microsoft Corporation, One Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA 02142
An Efficiency Theorem for Incompletely Known Preferences (Journal of Economic Theory 145 (6) (2010), 2463-2470)