I am a post-doc in the Economics group at Microsoft Research New England. My work is mainly in mechanism design, especially in non-equilibrium-based approaches to mechanism design. I am secretly way more awesome than this boring-looking website lets on. One day my website will reflect that and then the world will be MINE!!! But yeah, right now I haven't gotten around to making a better site, so uh, just pretend you didn't see this.
Contact information:
For non-Microsoft-related business: gdc@alum.mit.edu / +1 (617) 953-8419
For Microsoft-related business: gabrcarr@microsoft.com / +1 (857) 453-6181
Microsoft Corporation, One Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA 02142
Publications:
When are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient? / Online appendix (Econometrica 80 (2) (2012), 661-686)
An Efficiency Theorem for Incompletely Known Preferences (Journal of Economic Theory 145 (6) (2010), 2463-2470)
Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions / Online appendix (with James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte Madrian, and Andrew Metrick, Quarterly Journal of Economics 124 (4) (2009), 1639-1674)
Working papers:
Robustness and Linear Contracts
Robust Incentives for Information Acquisition
A Quantitative Approach to Incentives: Application to Voting Rules / Online appendices
The Efficiency-Incentive Tradeoff in Double Auction Environments
On Mechanisms Eliciting Ordinal Preferences
A General Equivalence Theorem for Allocation of Indivisible Objects
Efficient Random Assignment with Constrained Rankings
