Microsoft Research New England hosts guest speakers to present their work in our weekly Colloquium. The topics mirror the lab’s interdisciplinary focus that includes computer science, the social sciences and economics, and the talks are intended to be accessible to researchers in diverse fields. The agenda typically consists of approximately 50 minutes of prepared remarks, with about 30 additional minutes of Q&A, often interspersed within the talk. Members of the local academic community interested in attending are encouraged to arrive 20 minutes prior to start time to join us for tea.
Upcoming Colloquia Speakers
Joe Silverman, Brown
When: Wednesday, December 2, 2009
Time: 4:00 – 5:30 PM
The Hitchhiker's Guide to Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography is now 30+ years old, with new and exciting results appearing all the time, but the underlying hard mathematical problems on which (practical) public key cryptography is based are few and far between. In this talk I will discuss some of the history of public key cryptography and then describe the scant four mathematical problems, two from the 1970s, one from the 1980s, and one from the 1990s, that underlie virtually all current practical public key constructions. The emphasis will be on how these hard problems differ and on how their differences lead to public key cryptosystems with differing operating characteristics, especially in terms of speed, memory requirements, and other special properties. [Don’t Panic! Mathematical prerequisites will be kept to a minimum.]
Biography
Joseph Silverman is Professor of Mathematics at Brown University and currently a visitor at Microsoft Research New England. He is the author of seven books, including two graduate texts on elliptic curves that were awarded the American Mathematical Society Steele Prize for mathematical exposition and a recent undergraduate textbook on mathematical cryptography. He has written more than 100 research papers and is a co-inventor, with Jeff Hoffstein and Jill Pipher, of the NTRU public key cryptosystem. His primary research interests include elliptic curves, arithmetic geometry, mathematical foundations of cryptography, and number theoretic properties of dynamical systems.
Past Speakers
Vijay Vazirani, GA Tech
When: Wednesday, November 18, 2009
Time: 4:00 – 5:30 PM
Can Complexity Theory Ratify the “Invisible Hand of the Market”?
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker,
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard for their own interest.”
Each participant in a competitive economy is “led by an invisible hand to
promote an end which was no part of his intention.” -- Adam Smith, 1776.
With his treatise, The Wealth of Nations, 1776, Adam Smith initiated the field of economics, and his famous quote provided this field with its central guiding principle. The pioneering work of Walras (1874) gave a mathematical formulation for this statement, using his notion of market equilibrium, and opened up the possibility of a formal ratification. Mathematical ratification came with the celebrated Arrow-Debreu Theorem (1954), which established existence of equilibrium in a very general model of the economy; however, an efficient mechanism for finding an equilibrium has remained elusive. The question of algorithmic ratification was taken up in the earnest within theoretical computer science a decade ago, and attention soon gravitated on markets under piecewise-linear, concave utility functions. As it turned out, the recent resolution of this open problem did not yield the hoped-for mechanism; however, it did mark the end of the road for the current approach. It is now time to step back and plan a fresh attack, using the powerful tools of modern complexity theory and algorithms. After providing a summary of key developments through the ages and a gist of the recent results, we will discuss some ways of moving forward. (Based in part on recent work with Mihalis Yannakakis.)
Biography
Vijay Vazirani got his Bachelor's degree from MIT in 1979, his Ph.D. from U.C. Berkeley in 1983, and is currently Professor of Computer Science at Georgia Tech. His research career has been centered around the design of algorithms, together with work on complexity theory, cryptography, coding theory, and game theory. He is best known for his work on efficient algorithms for the classical maximum matching problem (1980's), fundamental complexity-theoretic results obtained using randomization (1980's), approximation algorithms for basic NP-hard optimization problems (1990's), and efficient algorithms for computing market equilibria (current). In 2001 he published what is widely viewed as the definitive book on approximation algorithms. This book has been translated into Japanese, French and Polish, and Persian and Chinese translations are forthcoming. In 2005 he initiated work on a comprehensive volume on algorithmic game theory; the co-edited volume appeared in 2007.
Nigel Shadbolt, U of Southampton
When: Wednesday, November 11, 2009
Time: 4:00 – 5:30 PM
Towards a Science of the Web
The World Wide Web has changed almost every aspect of modern life and touches us all. We use it to shop, date, entertain, communicate and research. It's billions of pages, links and other resources comprise the largest information fabric in the history of humanity. It is fundamentally a socio-technical system connecting hundreds of millions of people in networks that are constantly changing and evolving. How much of this do we understand? From a series of straightforward engineering protocols we see the emergence of large-scale structure. What evolutionary patterns have driven the Web's growth, and will they persist? How are tipping points reached, and can they be predicted or altered? What trends might fragment the Web? What properties create social effects, and how do social norms influence the viral update of Web capabilities? Answers to any of these questions would enhance our ability to maintain the Web as an accessible information technology to help humankind prosper. This talk will argue the case for a Science of the Web. This new interdisciplinary enterprise will require insights and methods from many disciplines. It demands that we understand the Web as an engineered construct that demands scientific analysis. It requires that we see the Web as a social construct that embodies all our human hopes and fears, interests and appetites. The talk will review progress to date as we seek to establish Web Science, discuss the major research insights that are emerging and look forward to the challenges ahead.
Biography
Nigel Shadbolt is Professor of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Deputy Head (Research) of the School of Electronics and Computer Science at the University of Southampton. He is a Founding Director of the Web Science Research Initiative, a joint endeavour between the University of Southampton and MIT. Together with Sir Tim Berners-Lee He has recently been given a special role by the Prime Minister to help transform public access to Government information. In its 50th Anniversary year 2006 - 07, Nigel was President of the British Computer Society. He is a Fellow of both the Royal Academy of Engineering and the British Computer Society. Between 2000-7, he was the Director of the £7.5m EPSRC Interdisciplinary Research Collaboration in Advanced Knowledge Technologies (AKT). He has recently been awarded a further £2m by the EPSRC to build on this work. He has been involved in a wide range of entrepreneurial activities. In 2006 he was one of three founding Directors and Chief Technology Officer of Garlik Ltd, a company specialising in consumer products and services to put people and their families in control of their own digital information. In 2008 Garlik was awarded Technology Pioneer status by the Davos World Economic Forum and won the prestigious UK national BT Flagship IT Award. He is the co-author of The Spy in the Coffee Machine and has an interest in issues to do with privacy and trust in the Digital age.
Ran Raz, Weizmann
When: Wednesday, November 4, 2009
Time: 4:00 – 5:30 PM
Parallel Repetition of Two-Prover Games: A Survey, Applications, and a Counterexample to Strong Parallel Repetition
I will give an introduction to the problem of parallel repetition of two-prover games and its applications to theoretical computer science, mathematics and physics. I will then describe a recent counterexample to the strong parallel repetition conjecture (a conjecture that would have had important applications). In a two-prover (alternatively, two-player) game, a referee chooses questions $(x,y)$ according to a (publicly known) distribution, and sends $x$ to the first player and $y$ to the second player. The first player responds by $a=a(x)$ and the second by $b=b(y)$ (without communicating with each other). The players jointly win if a (publicly known) predicate $V(x,y,a,b)$ holds. The value of the game is the maximal probability of success that the players can achieve, where the maximum is taken over all protocols $a=a(x),b=b(y)$. A parallel repetition of a two-prover game is a game where the players try to win $n$ copies of the original game simultaneously. More precisely, the referee generates questions $x=(x_1,...,x_n), y=(y_1,...,y_n)$, where each pair $(x_i,y_i)$ is chosen independently according to the original distribution. The players respond by $a=(a_1,...,a_n)$ and $b=(b_1,...,b_n)$. The players win if they win simultaneously on all the coordinates, that is, if for every $i$, $V(x_i,y_i,a_i,b_i)$ holds. The parallel repetition theorem states that for any two-prover game, with value $1-\epsilon$ (for, say, $\epsilon < 1/2$), the value of the game repeated in parallel $n$ times is at most $(1- \epsilon^3)^{\Omega(n/s)}$, where $s$ is the answers' length (of the original game). The theorem has important applications in complexity theory, quantum computation, and geometry. Several researchers asked whether this bound could be improved to $(1-\epsilon)^{\Omega(n/s)}$; this question is usually referred to as the strong parallel repetition problem. A positive answer would have had important applications. We show that the answer for this question is negative.
Biography
Ran Raz is a Professor of Mathematics and Computer Science at the Weizmann Institute of Science. He received his B.Sc in mathematics and physics and his PhD in mathematics from the Hebrew University, and after a short postdoc at Princeton University joint the Weizmann Institute. His main research area is complexity theory, with emphasis on proving lower bounds for computational models. More specifically, he is interested in Boolean and arithmetic circuit complexity, communication complexity, propositional proof theory, probabilistically checkable proofs, quantum computation and communication, and randomness and derandomization. He was a member at the Institute for Advanced Study (2000-2001, and fall 2002) and a visiting researcher at Microsoft Research Redmond (spring 2006). He is currently visiting Microsoft Research New England (July-December 2009).
Elizabeth Goodman, Berkeley
When: Wednesday, October 28, 2009
Time: 4:00 – 5:30 PM
Designing for Urban Green Space
Urban and suburban green space, as a technology of living well together, provides many benefits. But the stewardship of urban green space isn't usually associated with information technology. This talk maps out various directions in information technologies for promoting the creation and maintenance of urban green space. It discusses how assumptions about environmentalism, technology, nature, our relationship with living things shape the kinds of technologies people can and do make. In particular, it explores the possibilities of treating urban green spaces not as individual sites, but as parts of ecological networks that connect institutions, organizations, databases, sensors, water, plants, animals, chemicals -- and of course, people.
Biography
After brief summer research stints at Intel Research Berkeley and Fuji-Xerox Palo Alto focusing on social interaction in public places, I joined Intel's User Centered Design group as a design researcher. There, I focused on people-centered research and design for health and wellness. Since September 2006 I have been in the PhD program at UC Berkeley's School of Information. Peter Winkler, Dartmouth
When: Wednesday, October 21, 2009
Time: 4:00 – 5:30 PM
Luck versus Skill
With the recent federal crackdown on banks that support online gambling, the state courts are under pressure to decide whether various games constitute gambling. The usual criterion is whether a game is "predominantly" a game of chance, as opposed to skill. Can mathematicians (or statisticians) help the courts? After all, it should be an easy matter to examine tournament data and determine whether luck or skill is the predominant factor, right? We will discuss the obstacles to this approach and propose some ways to get around them.
Biography
Peter Winkler is Professor of Mathematics and Computer Science, and Albert Bradley Third Century Professor in the Sciences, at Dartmouth College. A winner of the Mathematical Association of America's Lester R. Ford Award for mathematical exposition, he is the author of about 135 mathematical research papers and holds a dozen patents in computing, cryptology, holography, optical networking and marine navigation. His research is primarily in combinatorics, probability, and the theory of computing, with forays into statistical physics. Prof. Winkler has also authored two collections of mathematical puzzles, a portfolio of compositions for ragtime piano, and (just completed) a book on uses of cryptography in the game of bridge.
Parag Pathak, MIT, Dept of Economics
When: Wednesday, October 14, 2009
Time: 4:00 – 5:30 PM
Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation
This paper introduces a method to compare direct mechanisms based on their vulnerability to manipulation or deviation from truthful reporting. We explore the following idea: if a player can manipulate mechanism psi whenever some player can manipulate mechanism phi, then psi is more manipulable than phi. Our notion generates a partial ordering on mechanisms based on their degree of manipulability. We illustrate the concept by comparing several well-known mechanisms in the matching and auction literature. The applications include comparisons between stable matching mechanisms, school choice mechanisms, auctions for internet advertising, and multi-unit auctions. This talk is based on joint work with Tayfun Sonmez of Boston College.
Biography
Parag Pathak is an economic theorist best known for his work on matching markets. He has been involved in designing the system used by the New York City Department of Education to assign students to high schools and the student assignment system in Boston Public Schools. He has also worked on various topics in applied microeconomics, including urban economics and the economics of education. He received his A.B. and S.M. Harvard University in Applied Mathematics in 2002, and his Ph.D. at Harvard in 2007. Formerly a Junior Fellow at Harvard's Society of Fellows, he is currently the Career Development Assistant Professor of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Raissa D'Souza, UC Davis, Depts. of Mechanical Engineering and Computer Science
When: Wednesday, October 7, 2009
Time: 4:00 – 5:30 PM
Growth and Phase Transitions In Isolated and Interacting Networks
Networks with complex structures and functions are pervasive in the modern world, spanning social, biological and technological systems. One feature common to many such networks is a broad variation in the number of edges incident to each node, and growth by preferential attachment, whereby the rich get richer, has been assumed as an explanatory axiom. I will show that an underlying local optimization mechanism can in fact give rise to preferential attachment. Another complex feature of evolving networks is that exhibit phase transitions, such as the sudden emergence of large-scale connectivity. I show that a variant of the classic Erdos-Renyi model of network formation (using the power of two choices) can alter the location and also the nature of the phase transition, making for an explosive onset of connectivity. Finally, in the past ten years a general theory of networks has been developing, but it applies only to isolated networks. In reality, individual networks are increasingly interdependent (e.g., the Internet and the power grid, globalization of financial markets and of social networks). I show that interactions between different types of networks can actually lower the critical threshold, allowing large-scale connectivity to be achieved with fewer overall connections, with implications for the spread of disease across geographic regions and the design of simple communications networks.
Biography
Raissa D'Souza is an Associate Professor at UC Davis in Mechanical Engineering and Computer Science, as well as an External Professor at the Santa Fe Institute. She received a PhD in statistical physics from MIT, then was a postdoctoral scholar, first at Bell Labs, then in the Theory Group at Microsoft Research. Dr. D'Souza's research focuses on self-organization, phase transitions and networked interactions occurring in natural and engineered systems, and her publications span the fields of physics, computer science, and applied mathematics.
Salvatore Torquato, Princeton, Dept of Chemistry
When: Wednesday, September 30, 2009
Time: 4:00 – 5:30 PM
Particle Packing Problems for Fun and Profit
Packing problems, such as how densely nonoverlapping particles fill d-dimensional Euclidean space Rd are ancient and still provide fascinating challenges for scientists and mathematicians [1,2]. Bernal has remarked that “heaps” (particle packings) were the first things that were ever measured in the form of basketfuls of grain for the purpose of trading or of collection of taxes. While maximally dense packings are intimately related to classical ground states of matter, disordered sphere packings have been employed to model glassy states of matter. There has been a resurgence of interest in maximally dense sphere packings in high-dimensional Euclidean spaces [3,4], which is directly related to the optimal way of sending digital signals over noisy channels. I begin by first describing “order” maps to classify jammed sphere packings, which enables one to view a host of packings with varying degrees of disorder as extremal structures. I discuss work that provides the putative exponential improvement on a 100-year- old lower bound on the maximal packing density due to Minkowski in Rd in the asymptotic limit d à [4]. Our study suggests that disordered (rather than ordered) sphere packings may be the densest for sufficiently large d – a counterintuitive possibility. Finally, I describe recent work to find and characterize dense packings of three-dimensional nonspherical shapes of various shapes, including the Platonic and Archimedean solids [5]. We conjecture that the densest packings of the Platonic and Archimedean solids with central symmetry are given by their corresponding densest lattice packings. This is the analogue of Kepler’s sphere conjecture for these solids.
Biography
Salvatore Torquato is Professor of Chemistry and the Princeton Institute for the Science and Technology of Materials at Princeton University. He is a Senior Faculty Fellow in the Princeton Center for Theoretical Science. He also hold appointments in four departments at Princeton: Physics, Applied and Computational Mathematics, Chemical Engineering, and Mechanical & Aerospace Engineering. He is broadly interested in the fundamental microscopic understanding of the structure and bulk properties of condensed matter using statistical mechanics. His current work has been focused on self-assembly theory, particle packing problems, quasicrystals, optimal multifunctional material design and cancer modeling. He has published over 280 journal articles and a book entitled ``Random Heterogeneous Materials." He is the recipient of numerous awards/honors, including the American Physical Society 2009 Adler Lectureship Award for Materials Physics, Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics 2007 Ralph E. Kleinman Prize and Society of Engineering Science 2004 William Prager Medal.
Yiling Chen, Harvard, Dept of Computer Science
When: Wednesday, September 23, 2009
Time: 4:00 – 5:30 PM
Strategic Behavior and Combinatorial Betting in Prediction Markets
Situated in a de facto standard market maker mechanism, this talk presents some recent results on analyzing and designing prediction markets for information aggregation. We take both economic and computational perspectives. From the economic perspective, we engage game theoretic analysis to investigate the equilibrium behavior of informed traders in prediction markets. We examine what information structures lead to truthful play by traders, meaning that traders reveal all of their information honestly as soon as they are able, and when traders have an incentive to lie about their own information, with the intention to strategically mislead other traders and profit later by correcting their errors. From the computational perspective, we design expressive betting languages for combinatorial prediction markets and examine the computational problem of pricing such markets. In our combinatorial markets, traders can submit bets of the form "horse A finishes in position 1, 2, or 5", "horse C beats horse D", "a Democrat wins Ohio and Florida", or "Duke wins a third round game in the NCAA basketball tournament". We find that pricing such markets are computationally intractable except for the single-elimination tournament betting. This is the first example of a tractable market-maker driven combinatorial market. Joint work with Stanko Dimitrov, Lance Fortnow, Sharad Goel, Rica Gonen, Robin D. Hanson, Nicolas Lambert, David M. Pennock, Daniel M. Reeves, Rahul Sami, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan.
Biography
Yiling Chen is an Assistant Professor of Computer Science at Harvard University. She received her Ph.D. in Information Sciences and Technology from the Pennsylvania State University. Prior to working at Harvard, she spent two years at the Microeconomic and Social Systems group of Yahoo! Research in New York City. Her general research interests are on the border of computer science and economics. She is interested in designing and analyzing social computing systems according to both computational and economic objectives.
Elchanan Mossel, Weizmann Institute and U.C. Berkeley
When: Wednesday, September 16, 2009
Time: 4:00 – 5:30 PM
Quantitative Social Choice Theory
Results in economics established in 50s-70s imply that there is no rational way to rank or elect a winner when there are 3 or more alternatives. We will consider the following question: Is it possible to rank or elect a winner in a way that is typically rational even if for some specific unlikely preferences of the voters it is not. The talk will provide historical background on the topic as well as hints to some of the exotic mathematical tools that are used in this theory. These include inverse hyper-contractive estimates, non-linear invariance and a new isoperemetric theory involving interfaces between 3 bodies.
Biography
Prof. Elchanan Mossel studies mathematical, probabilistic, and algorithmic problems arising in the theory of computing, as well as in such areas as molecular biology, evolution and social choice. He received his PhD from the Hebrew University, conducted postdoctoral studies in the theory group of Microsoft's research division, and was a Miller fellow at U.C Berkeley. He is now a faculty member in the departments of Statistics and Computer Science at U.C. Berkeley and a member of the faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science at the Weizmann Institute. He has received a number of prestigious grants and awards, including an Alfred Sloan Fellowship in Mathematics, a National Science Foundation Career Award and a BSF Bergman prize.
Bill Freeman, MIT
When: Wednesday, September 9, 2009
Time: 4:00 – 5:30 PM
Where Computer Vision Needs Help From Computer Science
I'll give my view of the frontier of computer vision and where I feel computer vision needs advances from computer science and machine learning. This will cover where computer vision works well: finding cars and faces, operating in controlled environments, and where it doesn't work well: in the uncontrolled settings of daily life. There will be a quick history object recognition. I'll list a number of computer vision problems, describe their structure, and tell where we need help.
Biography
Bill Freeman is Professor of Computer Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, joining the faculty in 2001. His current research interests include machine learning applied to computer vision and graphics, and computational photography. Dr. Freeman is active in the program and organizing committees of the major computer vision, graphics, and machine learning conferences, and was the program co-chair for the International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV) in 2005. From 1981 - 1987, he worked at Polaroid, developing image processing algorithms for electronic cameras and printers. In 1987-88, Dr. Freeman lived in China, working as a Foreign Expert at the Taiyuan University of Technology , P. R. of China. From 1992 - 2001 he worked at Mitsubishi Electric Research Labs (MERL), in Cambridge, MA, most recently as Sr. Research Scientist and Associate Director. He holds 25 patents and is an IEEE Fellow. A hobby is flying cameras in kites.
Erik Demaine, MIT
When: Wednesday, September 2, 2009
Time: 4:00 – 5:30 PM
Algorithms Meet Art, Puzzles, and Magic
When I was six years old, my father Martin Demaine and I designed and made puzzles as the Erik and Dad Puzzle Company, which distributed to toy stores across Canada. So began our journey into the interactions between algorithms and the arts (here, puzzle design). More and more, we find that our mathematical research and artistic projects converge, with the artistic side inspiring the mathematical side and vice versa. Mathematics itself is an art form, and through other media such as sculpture, puzzles, and magic, the beauty of mathematics can be brought to a wider audience. These artistic endeavors also provide us with deeper insights into the underlying mathematics, by providing physical realizations of objects under consideration, by pointing to interesting special cases and directions to explore, and by suggesting new problems to solve (such as the metapuzzle of how to solve a puzzle). This talk will give several examples in each category, from how our first font design led to a universality result in hinged dissections, to how studying curved creases in origami led to sculptures at MoMA. The audience will be expected to participate in some live magic demonstrations.
Biography
Erik Demaine is Associate Professor in computer science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Demaine's research interests range throughout algorithms, from data structures for improving web searches to the geometry of understanding how proteins fold to the computational difficulty of playing games. He received a MacArthur Fellowship (2003) as a "computational geometer tackling and solving difficult problems related to folding and bending--moving readily between the theoretical and the playful, with a keen eye to revealing the former in the latter". He cowrote a book about the theory of folding, together with Joseph O'Rourke, called Geometric Folding Algorithms: Linkages, Origami, Polyhedra (Cambridge University Press, 2007), and a book about the computational complexity of games, together with Robert Hearn, called Games, Puzzles, and Computation (A K Peters, 2009). His interests span the connections between mathematics and art, particularly sculpture and performance, including curved origami sculptures in the permanent collection of Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), New York.
Eric Maskin, Institute for Advanced Study
When: Tuesday, September 1, 2009
Time: 4:00 – 5:30 PM
Elections and Strategic Voting: Condorcet and Borda
We show that there is a sense in which the Condorcet method (simple majority rue) is less vulnerable to strategic voting than any other reasonable voting rule satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). If we drop the requirement of IIA, then Condorcet and the Borda method (rank-order voting) are jointly the least vulnerable to strategizing. Joint Work of P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin
Biography
Eric Maskin is an economic theorist best known for his work on the theory of mechanism design. For laying the foundations of this field he shared the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics. He has also made contributions to game theory, social choice theory, voting theory, monetary theory, contract theory, and the economics of intellectual property, among other areas. He is currently Albert O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton. A.B., Harvard University, 1972; Ph.D., Harvard, 1976; Research Fellow, Jesus College, Cambridge University, 1976-77; Assistant and Associate Professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1977-81; Professor, MIT, 1981-84; Professor, Harvard, 1985-2000, Louis Berkman Professor of Economics, Harvard, 1997-2000; Albert O. Hirschman Professor, Institute for Advanced Study, 2000-; Visiting Lecturer, Princeton University, 2000-; Editor, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1984-1990; Editor, Economics Letters 1992-; Director, Summer School in Economic Theory, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2008-; President-elect, Game Theory Society, 2008-2010, Guggenheim Fellow, 1981; Sloan Foundation Fellow, 1983-85; Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences; Fellow, Econometric Society (President, 2003); Member, National Academy of Sciences; Corresponding Fellow, British Academy; Honorary Fellow, St John's College, Cambridge; Kempe Award in Environmental Economics, 2007; Honorary Professor, Wuhan, Tsinghua, and Shenzhen Universities and Higher School of Economics, Moscow; Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, 2007; Doctor of Humane Letters, Bard College, 2008; Doctor honoris causa, Corvinus University of Budapest, 2008, Grand Medal of the City of Marseille, 2009.
Upcoming Speakers
- Dec 9 — Roz Picard, MIT Media Lab
- Dec 16 — Stephen Morris, Princeton
- Jan 20— Tarleton Gillespie, Cornell
- Feb 17 — Jeff Hancock, Cornell
- Feb 24 — Paul Milgrom, Stanford
Where
Microsoft Research New England
First Floor Conference Center
One Memorial Drive, Cambridge, MA
Arrival Guidance
Upon arrival at One Memorial Drive, kindly approach the Lobby Floor Security Desk, let them know that you are attending the Microsoft Research Colloquium, and ask them to direct you to the appropriate floor. Be prepared to show a picture ID and sign the building visitor Log.
