We examine many issues in the interface between game theory and algorithms and computation. In such domains, selfish agents interact, and each attempts to maximize its own profit. Such models have applications in many domains, such as electronic commerce, auctions, task and resource allocation and many more. Some of the models we consider are cooperative, where agents need each other to achieve their goals, and some are competitive. We investigate computational aspects of such domains, such as finding the optimal strategy, computing and testing for equilibrium, and designing stable and fair contracts. Example projects include the following.
- Collusion in auctions of various kinds
- Game theoretic models for security
- Coalition formation
- Fair contracts for cooperation
- Computing stable payoff allocations
- External subsidies for achieving cooperation, and the Cost of Stability
- Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir, Kyomin Jung, and Pushmeet Kohli, Coalitional Structure Generation in Skill Games, in AAAI 2010, 2010.
- Yoram Bachrach, Michael Zuckerman, and Jeff Rosenschein, Effort Games and the Price of Myopia, in Mathematical Logic Quarterly, Wiley, 2009.
- Yoram Bachrach, Honor Among Thieves — Collusion in Multi-Unit Auctions, in AAMAS 2010, 2010.
- Yoram Bachrach and Ely Porat, Path Disruption Games, in AAMAS 2010, 2010.
- Yoram Bachrach, Nadja Betzler, and Piotr Faliszewski, Probabilistic Possible-Winner Determination, in AAAI 2010, 2010.
- Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind, Reshef Meir, Dimitrii Pasechnik, Michael Zuckerman, Joerg Rothe, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games, in SAGT 2009, 2009.
- Ezra Resnick, Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir, and Jeff Rosenschein, The Cost of Stability in Network Flow Games, in MFCS 2009, 2009.