Economics and Computation

Core economics, game theory and recommendation systems


We are working in several areas from core economics and game theory, including empirical economics and theoretical economics, to algorithmic economics, algorithmic game theory, recommendation systems and the theory of social choice.

 

Publications

Moshe Babaioff, Moran Feldman, and Moshe Tennenholtz, Mechanism Design with Strategic Mediators, in The 6-th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS) conference, ACM – Association for Computing Machinery, 11 January 2015

Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, and S. Matthew Weinberg, A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer, in Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2014), IEEE – Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, October 2014

Frank Kelly, Peter Key, and Neil Walton, Efficient Advert Assignment, 12 September 2014

Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos, and Milan Vojnovic, Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games and Coalitional Dynamics, in SAGT 2014, Springer, September 2014

Nihar B. Shah and Dengyong Zhou, Double or Nothing: Multiplicative Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing, no. MSR-TR-2014-117, August 2014

More publications...