Economics and Computation

Core economics, game theory and recommendation systems


We are working in several areas from core economics and game theory, including empirical economics and theoretical economics, to algorithmic economics, algorithmic game theory, recommendation systems and the theory of social choice.

 

Publications

Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, and S. Matthew Weinberg, A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer, in Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2014), IEEE – Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, October 2014

Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos, and Milan Vojnovic, Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games and Coalitional Dynamics, in SAGT 2014, Springer, September 2014

Nihar B. Shah and Dengyong Zhou, Double or Nothing: Multiplicative Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing, no. MSR-TR-2014-117, August 2014

Long Tran-Thanh, Lampros Stavrogiannis, Victor Naroditskiy, Valentin Robu, Nicholas R Jennings, and Peter Key, Efficient Regret Bounds for Online Bid Optimisation in Budget-Limited Sponsored Search Auctions, in uai2014, 30th Conf. on Uncertainty in AI, AUAI, July 2014

Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan, and Renato Paes Leme, On the Efficiency of the Walrasian Mechanism, in ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC 2014), ACM, 10 June 2014

More publications...