Sequential Equilibrium Distributions in Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Types and Actions

We consider the question of how to define of sequential equilibria for multi-stage games with infinite type sets and infinite action sets. The definition should be a natural extension of Kreps and Wilson’s 1982 definition for finite games, should yield intuitively appropriate solutions for various examples, and should exist for a broad class of economically interesting games.

Speaker Details

Roger Myerson is Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago. He has a PhD from Harvard University and taught for 25 years in the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University before coming to the University of Chicago in 2001. He is the author of two books, Game Theory (Harvard U. Press, 1991) and Probability Models for Economic Decisions (Duxbury, 2005), and has published many professional articles on game theory, information economics, and economic analysis of political institutions. His analysis of incentive constraints in economic communication introduced several fundamental ideas of mechanism design theory, with applications in auction design, bargaining, and financial stabilization. He has used game-theoretic analysis to study political systems, with articles on comparative electoral systems, on strategic deterrence, on moral hazard and leadership in the foundations of the state, and on the vital importance of local democracy in state building. In 2007, he was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.

Date:
Speakers:
Roger Myerson
Affiliation:
University of Chicago