Speaker Manoj Prabhakaran
Affiliation University of Illinois
Host Vinod Vaikuntanathan
Date recorded 29 April 2011
Suppose that a receiver R wishes to publish an encryption of her secret input x so that every sender S, holding an input y, can reveal f(x,y) to R by sending her a single message. This should be done while simultaneously protecting the secrecy of y against a corrupted R and preventing a corrupted S from having an unfair influence on the output of R beyond what is allowed by f .
When the parties are semi-honest, practical solutions can be based on Yao’s garbled circuit technique. However, for the general problem when the parties, or even S alone, may be malicious, all known polynomial-time solutions are highly inefficient. This is due in part to the fact that known solutions make a non-black-box use of cryptographic primitives, e.g., for providing non-interactive zero- knowledge proofs of statements involving cryptographic computations on secrets.
Motivated by the above question, we consider the problem of secure two-party computation in a model that allows only parallel calls to an ideal oblivious transfer (OT) oracle with no additional interaction. We obtain the following results.
Combining the above results with 2-message (parallel) OT protocols in the CRS model, we get the first solutions to the initial motivating question which only make a black-box use of standard cryptographic primitives.
Joint work with Yuval Ishai, Eyal Kushilevitz, Rafail Ostrovsky and Amit Sahai.
©2011 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
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