From Circuits to RAM Programs in Malicious 2-party Computation

Secure 2-party computation (2PC) is becoming practical in some domains. However, most approaches are limited by the fact that the desired functionality must be represented as a boolean circuit. In response, the random-access machine (RAM) model has recently been investigated as a promising alternative to circuits.

In this talk, I will discuss some pitfalls of basing malicious-secure 2PC on the RAM model rather than circuits. I will then describe two new protocols for malicious-secure 2PC of RAM programs, whose performance relative to the semi-honest model matches the state of the art for circuit-based 2PC techniques. For malicious security with statistical security parameter 2-s, our protocol without preprocessing has overhead s compared to the semi-honest model; our protocol with preprocessing has overhead sim 2s/log T, where T is the running time of the RAM program.

This is joint work with Arash Afshar, Payman Mohassel, and Zhangxiang Hu.

Speaker Details

Mike Rosulek is an Assistant Professor in the School of EECS at Oregon State University. He holds a Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of Illinois and a B.S. in Computer Science from Iowa State University. His research interests are in cryptography, focusing on protocols for secure computation.

Date:
Speakers:
Mike Rosulek
Affiliation:
Oregon State University
    • Portrait of Jeff Running

      Jeff Running

Series: Microsoft Research Talks