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Deconstructing Process Isolation

Mark Aiken, Manuel Fähndrich, Chris Hawblitzel, Galen Hunt, and James Larus

Abstract

Most operating systems enforce process isolation through hardware protection mechanisms such as memory segmentation, page mapping, and differentiated user and kernel instructions. Singularity is a new operating system that uses software mechanisms to enforce process isolation. A software isolated process (SIP) is a process whose boundaries are established by language safety rules and enforced by static type checking. With proper system support, SIPs can provide a low cost isolation mechanism that provides failure isolation and fast inter-process communication. To compare the performance of Singularity’s approach against more conventional systems, we implemented an optional hardware isolation mechanism. Protection domains are hardware-enforced address spaces, which can contain one or more SIPs. Domains can either run at the kernel’s privilege levels and share an exchange heap or be fully isolated from the kernel and run at the normal application privilege level. These domains can construct Singularity configurations that are similar to micro-kernel and monolithic kernel systems. Hardware-based isolation incurs non-trivial performance costs (up to 25-33%) and complicates system implementation. Software isolation has less than 5% overhead on these benchmarks. The lower cost of SIPs permits them to provide protection and failure isolation at a finer granularity than conventional processes. Singularity’s ability to employ hardware isolation selectively, rather than at every process boundary, supports the construction of more resilient system architectures.

Details

Publication typeTechReport
URLftp://ftp.research.microsoft.com/pub/tr/TR-2006-43.pdf
NumberMSR-TR-2006-43
InstitutionMicrosoft Research
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