New Efficient Attacks on Statistical Disclosure Control Mechanisms

Cynthia Dwork and Sergey Yekhanin

Abstract

The goal of a statistical database is to provide statistics about a population while simultaneously protecting the privacy of the individual records in the database. The tension between privacy and usability of statistical databases has attracted much attention in statistics, theoretical computer science, security, and database communities in recent years. A line of research initiated by Dinur and Nissim investigates for a particular type of queries, lower bounds on the distortion needed in order to prevent gross violations of privacy. The first result in the current paper simplifies and sharpens the Dinur and Nissim result.

The Dinur-Nissim style results are strong because they demonstrate insecurity of all low-distortion privacy mechanisms. The attacks have an all-or-nothing flavor: letting n denote the size of the database, Ω(n) queries are made before anything is learned, at which point Θ(n) secret bits are revealed. Restricting attention to a wide and realistic subset of possible low-distortion mechanisms, our second result is a more acute attack, requiring only a fixed number of queries for each bit revealed.

Details

Publication typeInproceedings
Published inAdvances in Cryptology—CRYPTO 2008
URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-85174-5_26
Pages469-480
Volume5157
SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer Verlag
> Publications > New Efficient Attacks on Statistical Disclosure Control Mechanisms