Timothy Roscoe, Steve Hand, Rebecca Isaacs, Richard Mortier, and Paul Jardetzky
The Internet lacks a coherent model which unifies security (in terms of where packets are allowed to go) and routing (where packets should be sent), even in constrained environments. Routing and firewalling are generally treated as separate problems, in spite of their clear connection. In particular, security policies in data hosting centers, enterprise networks, and backbones are still by and large installed manually, and are prone to problems from errors and misconfigurations. In this paper, we present Predicate Routing as a solution to this problem. In current IP networks, the routing state of the system is primarily represented as a set of routing tables (local to each router) and a set of filtering rules (also local to each router or firewall). In contrast, Predicate Routing represents the state of the network as a set of boolean expressions associated with links which assert which kinds of packet can appear where. From these expressions, routing tables and filter rules can be derived automatically. Conversely, the consequences of a change in network state can be calculated for any point in the network (link, router, or end system), and predicates derived from known configuration state of routers and links. This subsumes notions of both routing and firewalling. We briefly describe our centralized implementation and then outline the extension of Internet routing protocols to support Predicate Routing.
|Published in||Proceedings of HotNets-I (2002), Computer Communication Review (CCR)|
|Institution||Intel Research, Berkeley|