A Theory of Secure Control-Flow

Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) means that the execution of a program dynamically follows only certain paths, in accordance with a static policy. CFI can prevent attacks that, by exploiting buffer overflows and other vulnerabilities, attempt to control program behavior. This paper develops the basic theory that underlies two practical techniques for CFI enforcement, with precise formulations of hypotheses and guarantees.

icfem05.pdf
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In  International Conference on Formal Engineering Methods (ICFEM)

Publisher  Springer-Verlag
All copyrights reserved by Springer 2004.

Details

TypeInproceedings
URLhttp://www.springer-ny.com/
Pages111-124
NumberMSR-TR-2005-17
InstitutionMicrosoft Research
AddressManchester, UK
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