Computer-Aided Cryptographic Proofs

Gilles Barthe, Benjamin Grégoire, and Santiago Zanella-Béguelin

Abstract

Provable security is at the heart of modern cryptography. It advocates a mathematical approach in which the security of new cryptographic constructions is defined rigorously, and provably reduced to one or several assumptions, such as the hardness of a computational problem, or the existence of an ideal functionality. A typical provable security statement is of the form: for any adversary A against the cryptographic construction S, there exists an adversary B against a security assumption H, such that if A has a high probability of breaking the scheme S in time t, then B has a high probability of breaking the assumption H in time t′ (defined as a function of t).

Details

Publication typeInproceedings
Published in19th International Symposium on Static Analysis, SAS 2012
URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33125-1_1
Pages1-2
Volume7460
SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer
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