Share on Facebook Tweet on Twitter Share on LinkedIn Share by email
A Machine-Checked Formalization of Sigma-Protocols

Gilles Barthe, Daniel Hedin, Santiago Zanella-Béguelin, Benjamin Grégoire, and Sylvain Heraud

Abstract

Zero-knowledge proofs have a vast applicability in the domain of cryptography, stemming from the fact that they can be used to force potentially malicious parties to abide by the rules of a protocol, without forcing them to reveal their secrets. Sigma-protocols are a class of zero-knowledge proofs that can be implemented efficiently and that suffice for a great variety of practical applications. This paper presents a first machine-checked formalization of a comprehensive theory of Sigma-protocols. The development includes basic definitions, relations between different security properties that appear in the literature, and general composability theorems. We show its usefulness by formalizing—and proving the security—of concrete instances of several well-known protocols. The formalization builds on CertiCrypt, a framework that provides support to reason about cryptographic systems in the Coq proof assistant, and that has been previously used to formalize security proofs of encryption and signature schemes.

Details

Publication typeInproceedings
Published in23rd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2010
URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2010.24
Pages246-260
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
> Publications > A Machine-Checked Formalization of Sigma-Protocols