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Analysis and Optimization of Cryptographically Generated Addresses

Joppe W. Bos, Onur Özen, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux

Abstract

The need for nodes to be able to generate their own address and verify those from others, without relying on a global trusted authority, is a well-known problem in networking. One popular technique for solving this problem is to use self-certifying addresses that are widely used and standardized; a prime example is cryptographically generated addresses (CGA). We re-investigate the attack models that can occur in practice and analyze the security of CGA-like schemes. As a result, an alternative protocol to CGA, called CGA++, is presented. This protocol eliminates several attacks applicable to CGA and increases the overall security. In many ways, CGA++ offers a nice alternative to CGA and can be used notably for future developments of the Internet Protocol version 6.

Details

Publication typeInproceedings
Published inInformation Security Conference – ISC 2009
URLhttp://www.springerlink.com/content/m2616p83k64628t6/
Pages17–32
Volume5735
SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
PublisherSpringer
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