Peter Key and Alexandre Proutiere
In this paper, we introduce and investigate a novel class of multipath routing games with elastic traffic. Users open one or more connections along different feasible paths from
source to destination and act selfishly— seeking to transfer data as fast as possible. Users only control their routing choices , and once these choices have been made, the connection rates are elastic and determined via congestion control algorithms (e.g. TCP) which ultimately maximize a certain notion of the network utility. We analyze the existence and the performance of the Nash Equilibria (NEs) of the resulting routing games.
In Performance Evaluation Review
Publisher Association for Computing Machinery, Inc.
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