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Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, and Noam Nisan

We consider a network of sellers, each selling a single product, where the graph structure represents pair-wise complementarities between products. We study how the network structure affects revenue and social welfare of equilibria of the pricing game between the sellers. We prove positive and negative results, both of "Price of Anarchy" and of "Price of Stability" type, for special families of graphs (paths, cycles) as well as more general ones (trees, graphs). We describe best-reply dynamics that...

Publication details
Date: 1 July 2016
Type: Inproceeding
Oliver Hinz, Shawndra Hill, and Ju-Young Kim

Timing online auctions to attract a large number of prospective buyers is important for sellers. This study examines whether online auction sellers need to account for exogenous effects like TV viewing when timing and predicting their auction results. An ongoing debate questions whether TV viewers can spread their attention across multiple devices while watching TV, for example, by concurrently shopping online or posting on social media. Recent research has focused on understanding cross-media effects;...

Publication details
Date: 1 May 2016
Type: Article
Yoram Bachrach, Sofia Ceppi, Ian A. Kash, Peter Key, and Mohammad Reza Khani

The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction has appealing properties when ads are simple (text based and identical in size), but does not generalize to richer ad settings, whereas truthful mechanisms such as VCG do. However, a straight switch from GSP to VCG incurs significant revenue loss for the search engine. We introduce a transitional mechanism which encourages advertisers to update their bids to their valuations, while mitigating revenue loss. In this setting, it is easier to propose first a...

Publication details
Date: 1 April 2016
Type: Inproceeding
Publisher: WWW – World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)
Milan Vojnovic and Se-Young Yun

We consider a team selection problem that requires to hire a team of individuals that maximizes a profit function defined as difference of the utility of production and the cost of hiring. We show that for any monotone submodular utility of production and any increasing cost function of the team size with increasing marginal costs, a natural greedy algorithm guarantees a 1 − log(a)/(a − 1)– approximation when a ≤ e and a 1 − a/e(a − 1)–approximation when a ≥ e, where a is the ratio of the utility of...

Publication details
Date: 1 February 2016
Type: Technical report
Publisher: Microsoft Research
Number: MSR-TR-2016-7
Moshe Babaioff, Moran Feldman, and Moshe Tennenholtz
Publication details
Date: 1 January 2016
Type: Article
Number: 2
Ian A. Kash and Peter B. Key
Publication details
Date: 1 December 2015
Type: Article
Publisher: IEEE – Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Dan Goldstein, Hal E. Hershfield, and Shlomo Benartzi

Research on choice architecture is shaping policy around the world, touching on areas ranging from retirement economics to environmental issues. Recently, researchers and policy makers have started to pay more attention not just to choice architecture but also to information architecture: the format in which information is presented to people. Here, we investigate information architecture as it applies to consumption in retirement. Specifically, in three experiments, we examine how people react to lump...

Publication details
Date: 1 December 2015
Type: Article
Etan Green, Justin M Rao, and David M Rothschild

We conduct field and laboratory experiments on the same panel of experts, measuring the internal consistency of their predictions 1) in the field, in their domain of expertise, and 2) on a conceptually identical laboratory exercise. Experts make internally consistent predictions in the field, both in absolute terms and relative to a panel of novices, but they exhibit markedly less consistency on the isomorphic lab exercise. Possible explanations for this fading expertise include low motivation in the...

Publication details
Date: 1 September 2015
Type: Article
Yair Zick, Yoram Bachrach, Ian A. Kash, and Peter Key

We consider revenue negotiation problems in iterative settings. In our model, a group of agents has some initial resources, used in order to generate revenue. Agents must agree on some way of dividing resources, but there’s a twist. At every time-step, the revenue shares received at time t are agent resources at time t + 1, and the game is repeated. The key issue here is that the way resources are shared has a dramatic effect on longterm social welfare, so in order to maximize...

Publication details
Date: 1 August 2015
Type: Article
Amit Sharma, Jake M. Hofman, and Duncan J. Watts

Recommendation systems are an increasingly prominent part of the web, accounting for up to a third of all traffic on several of the world’s most popular sites. Nevertheless, little is known about how much activity such systems actually cause over and above activity that would have occurred via other means (e.g., search) if recommendations were absent. Although the ideal way to estimate the causal impact of recommendations is via randomized experiments, such experiments are costly and may inconvenience...

Publication details
Date: 1 June 2015
Type: Inproceeding
Publisher: ACM
Hoda Heidari, Sébastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

We provide the first concrete algorithm for combining market makers and limit orders in a prediction market with continuous trade. Our mechanism is general enough to handle both bundle orders and arbitrary securities defined over combinatorial outcome spaces. We define the notion of an approximately fair trading path, a path in security space along which no order executes at a price more than a fixed tolerance above its limit, and every order executes when its market price falls more than a fixed...

Publication details
Date: 1 June 2015
Type: Inproceeding
Publisher: ACM – Association for Computing Machinery
Moshe Babaioff, Renato Paes Leme, and Balasubramanian Sivan

In various markets where sellers compete in price, price oscillations are observed rather than convergence to equilibrium. Such fluctuations have been empirically observed in the retail market for gasoline, in airline pricing and in the online sale of consumer goods. Motivated by this, we study a model of price competition in which equilibria rarely exist. We seek to analyze the welfare, despite the nonexistence of equilibria, and present welfare guarantees as a function of the market power of the...

Publication details
Date: 1 June 2015
Type: Proceedings
Publisher: ACM – Association for Computing Machinery
Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, and Aleksandrs Slivkins

It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a single call to a monotone allocation rule. Our main result is a general procedure to take a monotone allocation rule for a single-parameter domain and transform it (via a black-box reduction) into a randomized mechanism that is truthful in expectation and individually...

Publication details
Date: 1 May 2015
Type: Article
Publisher: ACM
Number: 2
Chien-Ju Ho, Alex Slivkins, Siddharth Suri, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
Publication details
Date: 1 May 2015
Type: Inproceeding
Chien-Ju Jo, Siddharth Suri, Aleksandrs Slivkins, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

We study the causal effects of financial incentives on the quality of crowdwork. We focus on performance-based payments (PBPs), bonus payments awarded to workers for producing high quality work. We design and run randomized behavioral experiments on the popular crowdsourcing platform Amazon Mechanical Turk with the goal of understanding when, where, and why PBPs help, identifying properties of the payment, payment structure, and the task itself that make them most effective. We provide examples of tasks...

Publication details
Date: 1 May 2015
Type: Article
Yoad Lewenberg, Yoram Bachrach, Yonatan Sompolinsky, Aviv Zohar, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein

Bitcoin is an innovative decentralized cryptocurrency whose core security relies on a proof of work procedure, which requires network participants to repeatedly compute hashes on inputs from a large search space. Finding one of the rare inputs that generates an extremely low hash value is considered a successful attempt, allowing miners to approve new transactions and, in return, to collect rewards in bitcoins.

This reward allocation, which provides the incentive for miners to participate, is a...

Publication details
Date: 1 May 2015
Type: Article
Nicolas S. Lambert, John Langford, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, Yiling Chen, Daniel Reeves, Yoav Shoham, and David M. Pennock
Publication details
Date: 1 March 2015
Type: Article
Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, and Aaron Roth
Publication details
Date: 1 March 2015
Type: Article
Publisher: Elsevier
Moshe Babaioff, Moran Feldman, and Moshe Tennenholtz

We consider the problem of designing mechanisms that interact with strategic agents through strategic intermediaries (or mediators), and investigate the cost to society due to the mediators' strategic behavior. Selfish agents with private information are each associated with exactly one strategic mediator, and can interact with the mechanism exclusively through that mediator. Each mediator aims to optimize the combined utility of his agents, while the mechanism aims to optimize the combined utility of...

Publication details
Date: 11 January 2015
Type: Inproceeding
Publisher: ACM – Association for Computing Machinery
Yair Zick, Yoram Bachrach, Ian A. Kash, and Peter Key
Publication details
Date: 1 January 2015
Type: Inproceeding
Sofia Ceppi and Ian A. Kash
Publication details
Date: 1 January 2015
Type: Inproceeding
Yuezhou Lv and Thomas Moscibroda

In a basic economic system, each participant receives a (financial) reward according to his own contribution. In this work, we study an alternative approach – Incentive Networks – in which a participant’s reward depends not only on his own contribution; but also in part on the contributions made by his social contacts or friends. We show that the key parameter effecting the efficiency of such an Incentive Network-based economic system depends on the participant’s degree of directed altruism....

Publication details
Date: 1 January 2015
Type: Inproceeding
Publisher: AAAI - Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
Ben Roberts, Dinan Gunawardena, Ian A. Kash, and Peter Key
Publication details
Date: 1 January 2015
Type: Article
Yoram Bachrach, Sofia Ceppi, Ian A. Kash, Peter Key, and Mohammad Reza Khani
Publication details
Date: 1 January 2015
Type: Inproceeding
Yiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian A. Kash, Tal Moran, and Salil Vadhan
Publication details
Date: 1 January 2015
Type: Article
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