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Hoda Heidari, Sébastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

We provide the first concrete algorithm for combining market makers and limit orders in a prediction market with continuous trade. Our mechanism is general enough to handle both bundle orders and arbitrary securities defined over combinatorial outcome spaces. We define the notion of an approximately fair trading path, a path in security space along which no order executes at a price more than a fixed tolerance above its limit, and every order executes when its market price falls more than a fixed...

Publication details
Date: 1 June 2015
Type: Inproceeding
Publisher: ACM – Association for Computing Machinery
Moshe Babaioff, Renato Paes Leme, and Balasubramanian Sivan

In various markets where sellers compete in price, price oscillations are observed rather than convergence to equilibrium. Such fluctuations have been empirically observed in the retail market for gasoline, in airline pricing and in the online sale of consumer goods. Motivated by this, we study a model of price competition in which equilibria rarely exist. We seek to analyze the welfare, despite the nonexistence of equilibria, and present welfare guarantees as a function of the market power of the...

Publication details
Date: 1 June 2015
Type: Proceedings
Publisher: ACM – Association for Computing Machinery
Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, and Aleksandrs Slivkins

It is widely believed that computing payments needed to induce truthful bidding is somehow harder than simply computing the allocation. We show that the opposite is true: creating a randomized truthful mechanism is essentially as easy as a single call to a monotone allocation rule. Our main result is a general procedure to take a monotone allocation rule for a single-parameter domain and transform it (via a black-box reduction) into a randomized mechanism that is truthful in expectation and individually...

Publication details
Date: 1 May 2015
Type: Article
Publisher: ACM
Number: 2
Chien-Ju Ho, Alex Slivkins, Siddharth Suri, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
Publication details
Date: 1 May 2015
Type: Inproceeding
Nicolas S. Lambert, John Langford, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan, Yiling Chen, Daniel Reeves, Yoav Shoham, and David M. Pennock
Publication details
Date: 1 March 2015
Type: Article
Moshe Babaioff, Moran Feldman, and Moshe Tennenholtz

We consider the problem of designing mechanisms that interact with strategic agents through strategic intermediaries (or mediators), and investigate the cost to society due to the mediators' strategic behavior. Selfish agents with private information are each associated with exactly one strategic mediator, and can interact with the mechanism exclusively through that mediator. Each mediator aims to optimize the combined utility of his agents, while the mechanism aims to optimize the combined utility of...

Publication details
Date: 11 January 2015
Type: Inproceeding
Publisher: ACM – Association for Computing Machinery
Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, and Aaron Roth
Publication details
Date: 1 January 2015
Type: Article
Publisher: Elsevier
Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, and S. Matthew Weinberg

In this letter we briefly survey our main result from [Babaioff el al. 2014]: a simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanism for a monopolist who wants to sell a variety of items to a single buyer with an additive valuation.

Publication details
Date: 1 December 2014
Type: Article
Publisher: ACM – Association for Computing Machinery
Number: 2
Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, and S. Matthew Weinberg

We consider a monopolist seller with n heterogeneous items, facing a single buyer. The buyer has a value for each item drawn independently according to (non-identical) distributions, and his value for a set of items is additive. The seller aims to maximize his revenue. It is known that an optimal mechanism in this setting may be quite complex, requiring randomization [HR12] and menus of infinite size [DDT13]. Hart and Nisan [HN12] have initiated a study of two very simple pricing schemes for this...

Publication details
Date: 1 October 2014
Type: Inproceeding
Publisher: IEEE – Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Eva Tardos, and Milan Vojnovic

We introduce a framework for studying the effect of cooperation on the quality of outcomes in utility games. Our framework is a coalitional analog of the smoothness framework of non-cooperative games. Coalitional smoothness implies bounds on the strong price of anarchy, the loss of quality of coalitionally stable outcomes. Our coalitional smoothness framework captures existing results bounding the strong price of anarchy of network design games. Moreover, we give novel strong price of anarchy results...

Publication details
Date: 1 September 2014
Type: Inproceeding
Publisher: Springer
Nihar B. Shah and Dengyong Zhou

Many fields of science and engineering, ranging from predicting protein structures to building machine translation systems, require large amounts of labeled data. These labeling tasks have traditionally been performed by experts; the limited pool of experts would limit the size of the datasets, and make the process slow and expensive. In recent years, there is a rapidly increasing interest in using crowds of semi-skilled workers recruited through the Internet. While this 'crowdsourcing' can cheaply...

Publication details
Date: 1 August 2014
Type: Technical report
Number: MSR-TR-2014-117
Long Tran-Thanh, Lampros Stavrogiannis, Victor Naroditskiy, Valentin Robu, Nicholas R Jennings, and Peter Key

We study the problem of an advertising agent who needs to intelligently distribute her budget across a sequence of online keyword bidding auctions. We assume the closing price of each auction is governed by the same unknown distribution, and study the problem of making provably optimal bidding decisions. Learning the distribution is done under censored observations, i.e. the closing price of an auction is revealed only if the bid we place is above it. We consider three algorithms, namely...

Publication details
Date: 1 July 2014
Type: Inproceeding
Publisher: AUAI
Miroslav Dudik, Rafael Frongillo, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
Publication details
Date: 1 July 2014
Type: Inproceeding
Moshe Babaioff and Eyal Winter

We study the complexity required for the implementation of multi-agent contracts under a variety of solution concepts. A contract is a mapping from strategy profiles to outcomes. Practical implementation of a contract requires it to be ”simple”, an illusive concept that needs to be formalized. A major source of complexity is the burden involving verifying the contract fulfillment (for example in a court of law). Contracts which specify a small number of outcomes are easier to verify and are less prone...

Publication details
Date: 10 June 2014
Type: Inproceeding
Publisher: ACM
Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan, and Renato Paes Leme

Central results in economics guarantee the existence of efficient equilibria for various classes of markets. An underlying assumption in early work is that agents are price-takers, i.e., agents honestly report their true demand in response to prices. A line of research in economics, initiated by Hurwicz (1972), is devoted to understanding how such markets perform when agents are strategic about their demands. This is captured by the Walrasian Mechanism that proceeds by collecting reported...

Publication details
Date: 10 June 2014
Type: Inproceeding
Publisher: ACM
Daniel G. Goldstein, R. Preston McAfee, and Siddharth Suri

The “wisdom of crowds” refers to the phenomenon that aggregated predictions from a large group of people can rival or even beat the accuracy of experts. In domains with substantial stochastic elements, such as stock picking, crowd strategies (e.g. indexing) are difficult to beat. However, in domains in which some crowd members have demonstrably more skill than others, smart sub-crowds could possibly outperform the whole. The central question this work addresses is whether such smart subsets of a crowd...

Publication details
Date: 8 June 2014
Type: Inproceeding
Publisher: ACM
Winter Mason, Siddharth Suri, and Duncan J. Watts

Cooperation in repeated games has been widely studied in experimental settings; however, the duration over which players participate in such experiments is typically confined to at most hours, and often to a single game. Given that in real world settings people may have years of experience, it is natural to ask how behavior in cooperative games evolves over the long run. Here we analyze behavioral data from three distinct games involving 571 individual experiments conducted over a two-year interval....

Publication details
Date: 8 June 2014
Type: Inproceeding
Publisher: ACM
Yoram Bachrach, Sofia Ceppi, Ian A. Kash, Peter Key, and David Kurokawa

We examine trade-offs among stakeholders in ad auctions. Our metrics are the revenue for the utility of the auctioneer, the number of clicks for the utility of the users and the welfare for the utility of the advertisers. We show how to optimize linear combinations of the stakeholder utilities, showing that these can be tackled through a GSP auction with a per-click reserve price. We then examine constrained optimization of stakeholder utilities.

We use simulations and analysis of real-world...

Publication details
Date: 1 June 2014
Type: Proceedings
Publisher: ACM
Frank Kelly, Peter Key, and Neil Walton

We consider a large-scale Ad-auction where adverts are assigned over a potentially infinite number of searches. We capture the intrinsic asymmetries in information between advertisers, the advert platform and the space of searches: advertisers know and can optimize the average performance of their advertisement campaign; the platform knows and can optimize on each search instance; and, neither party knows the distribution of the infinite number of searches that can occur. We look at maximizing the...

Publication details
Date: 1 June 2014
Type: Inproceeding
Publisher: ACM Electronic Commerce
Shipra Agrawal and Nikhil R. Devanur

In this paper, we consider a very general model for exploration-exploitation tradeoff which allows arbitrary concave rewards and convex constraints on the decisions across time, in addition to the customary limitation on the time horizon. This model subsumes the classic multi-armed bandit (MAB) model, and the Bandits with Knapsacks (BwK) model of Badanidiyuru et al.[2013]. We also consider an extension of this model to allow linear contexts, similar to the linear contextual extension of the MAB model....

Publication details
Date: 1 June 2014
Type: Inproceeding
Publisher: ACM conference on Economics and Computation
Yiling Chen, Nikhil R. Devanur, David M. Pennock, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
Publication details
Date: 1 June 2014
Type: Inproceeding
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, John Langford, and Aleksandrs Slivkins
Publication details
Date: 1 January 2014
Type: Inproceeding
Publication details
Date: 1 January 2014
Type: Inproceeding
Leon Bottou, Jonas Peters, Joaquin Quiñonero-Candela, Denis X. Charles, D. Max Chickering, Elon Portugaly, Dipankar Ray, Patrice Simard, and Ed Snelson

This work shows how to leverage causal inference to understand the behavior of complex learning systems interacting with their environment and predict the consequences of changes to the system. Such predictions allow both humans and algorithms to select the changes that would have improved the system performance. This work is illustrated by experiments on the ad placement system associated with the Bing search engine.

Publication details
Date: 1 November 2013
Type: Article
Publisher: Journal of Machine Learning Research
Number: Nov
Brendan Lucier, Ishai Menache, Joseph Naor, and Jonathan Yaniv

We consider mechanisms for online deadline-aware scheduling in large computing clusters. Batch jobs that run on such clusters often require guarantees on their completion time (i.e., deadlines). However, most existing scheduling systems implement fair-share resource allocation between users, an approach that ignores heterogeneity in job requirements and may cause deadlines to be missed. In our framework, jobs arrive dynamically and are characterized by their value and total resource demand (or...

Publication details
Date: 1 July 2013
Type: Inproceeding
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